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Phantasia/imagination (φαντασία) in Aristotle is one of the parts (µόρια) or faculties/powers 
(δυνάµεις) of the soul that cannot exist apart from sensation (αἴσθησις) and thought (διάνοια). 
The function of phantasia and its connection with phantasmata (φαντάσµατα), the products 
of this faculty, plays a significant role in the psychological treatises of the Aristotelian 
Corpus. The purpose of this paper is to examine the concept of phantasia in Book III, Chapter 
3 of De Anima, and to show that the Stageirite philosopher distinguishes three and not two 
kinds of phantasia, starting from the lowest, which is found in imperfect creatures, to the 
highest, which appears only in the human beings.  
 
Introduction 
Aristotle’s De Αnima (Περὶ Ψυχῆς) is one of the major treatises. In this 
treatise the nature and the role of the soul (ψυχῆς) are analyzed and for this reason it 
is often characterized as Aristotle’s psychology. Most of the discussion is concerned 
with ‘mental’ functions, however there is also a certain amount of physiology and 
biology. As Michael Durrant stresses «the De Αnima presents the first systematic 
attempt to deal with a whole range of topics and problems falling under the general 
heading of ‘Philosophical Psychology’»1. 
                                                          
* A previous draft of the present paper was presented at the Workshop in Philosophy entitled «What it 
is to be Alive: Vital and Cognitive Functions in Aristotle’s De Anima» (February 6-7, 2010), 
University of Kassel, Institute of Philosophy, Germany. I am very grateful to Professor Gottfried 
Heinemann and Dr Rainer Timme for inviting me to participate in this Workshop. I would also like to 
sincerely thank all the participants for their valuable and insightful comments. I really enjoyed the 
conversation with them. In addition, I would like to express my special thanks to Professor Demetra 
Sfendoni-Mentzou for her critical suggestions to improve the content of my paper. Finally, this paper is 
based on a research that has been co-financed by the European Union (European Social Fund – ESF) 
and Greek national funds through the Operational Program "Education and Lifelong Learning" of the 
National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF) - Research Funding Program: THALIS –UOA 
(2007-2013). 
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In this paper I shall try to elaborate systematically the role of 
phantasia/imagination (φαντασία) and its relation to phantasmata (φαντάσματα), 
namely the products of the faculty/power of phantasia, in Aristotle’s De Anima. To be 
more precise, I shall examine the unified concept of phantasia in De Anima as 
follows: 
Ι. I shall present briefly Aristotle’s concepts of the various parts (μόρια) or 
faculties/powers (δυνάμεις) of the soul. Namely, I shall focus my attention on the 
Aristotelian psychic faculties/powers and the way they correlate with the living 
beings. 
ΙΙ. I shall outline and explore the notion of phantasia, which is described by the 
Stageirite philosopher as: (a) the faculty/power (δύναμις) by which a phantasma is 
presented to us («εἰ δή ἐστιν ἡ φαντασία καθ᾽ ἣν λέγομεν φάντασμά τι ἡμῖν 
γίγνεσθαι»)2, (b) the faculty/power which is not sensation (αἴσθησις), or opinion 
(δόξα), or knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), or intellect (νοῦς), and (c) the type of motion 
(κίνησις), which is generated by actual perception («ἡ φαντασία ἂν εἴη κίνησις ὑπὸ 
τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν γιγνομένη»)3. Furthermore, I shall argue that we 
need to be very careful about how we interpret the word «φάντασμα» in the 
Aristotelian texts. 
ΙΙΙ. Finally, I shall try to demonstrate that when we study in depth the notion of 
phantasia (φαντασία), as it is described in Book III of De Anima, we can realize that 
Aristotle speaks about three and not two kinds or grades of phantasia.  
I. Parts (Μόρια) or Faculties/Powers (Δυνάμεις) of the Soul 
In Book II, Chapter 1 of De Anima Aristotle describes the soul as «ἐντελέχεια ἡ 
πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ» («the first actuality of a natural organic 
                                                                                                                                                                      
1
 Aristotle, Aristotle’s De Anima in Focus, edited by Michael Durrant (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1993), p. 3. 
2
 Aristotle, De Anima, III, 3, 428 a 1-2. 
3
 Ibid., III, 3, 429 a 1-2. 
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body»)4. The soul is organically connected with the body. The soul is the form 
(μορφή or εἶδος) of the body, while the body is the matter (ὕλη) of the soul 
(hylomorphism). According to Aristotle, the soul is inseparable from the body. The 
soul and body are not two separate entities but one composite substance.  
In addition, the philosopher distinguishes different parts (μόρια) or 
faculties/powers (δυνάμεις) of the soul corresponding to different kinds of living 
beings. These parts perform, as we shall see later in the present paper, specific 
functions; however they form a unified whole. 
Aristotle in Book III of De Anima refers to an infinite number of parts of the soul:  
«ἔχει δὲ ἀπορίαν εὐθὺς πῶς τε δεῖ μόρια λέγειν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ πόσα. τρόπον γάρ 
τινα ἄπειρα φαίνεται»5.  
But which are the parts (μόρια) or faculties/powers (δυνάμεις) of the soul 
according to Aristotle? The Stageirite philosopher defines the soul as «τοῦτο ᾧ 
ζῶμεν καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα καὶ διανοούμεθα πρώτως·» («that with which we 
primarily live, perceive and think»)6 and as that which is associated with the 
following faculties/powers (δυνάμεις). In the next passages Aristotle distinguishes 
three faculties of the soul: 
(a) De Generatione Animalium, Book II, Chapter 3, 736 b 8-14:  
«Τὴν μὲν οὖν θρεπτικὴν ψυχὴν7 τὰ σπέρματα καὶ τὰ κυήματα τὰ <ἀ>χώριστα 
δῆλον ὅτι δυνάμει μὲν ἔχοντα θετέον, ἐνεργείᾳ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔχοντα, πρὶν ἢ καθάπερ τὰ 
χωριζόμενα τῶν κυημάτων ἕλκει τὴν τροφὴν καὶ ποιεῖ τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης ψυχῆς 
                                                          
4
 Ibid., II, 1, 412 b 5-6. This is the last of the three general definitions of the soul outlined by Aristotle 
in Book II, Chapter 1 of the treatise De Anima. The other two are the following: (i) Ibid., II, 1, 412 a 
19-21: «τὴν ψυχὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι ὡς εἶδος σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος», «the 
soul is substance in the sense of a natural body having life in potentiality» and (ii) Ibid., II, 1, 412 a 21-
22: «ἡ δ᾽ οὐσία ἐντελέχεια· τοιούτου ἄρα σώματος ἐντελέχεια», «And substance is actuality. 
Therefore it is actuality of such as this body». 
5
 Aristotle, op. cit., III, 9, 432 a 22-24: «in what sense we are to speak of parts of the soul and how 
many they are. For in a sense their number is innumerable».  
6
 Ibid., II, 2, 414 a 12-13. 
7
 The emphasis in the present paper is added. 
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ἔργον· πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἅπαντ᾽ ἔοικε ζῆν τὰ τοιαῦτα φυτοῦ βίον. ἑπομένως δὲ 
δῆλον ὅτι καὶ περὶ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς λεκτέον ψυχῆς καὶ περὶ τῆς νοητικῆς·»8 
(b) De Anima, Book II, Chapter 4, 415 a 14-18 and Book ΙΙΙ, Chapter 9, 432 b 6-7:  
«Ἀναγκαῖον δὲ τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ τούτων σκέψιν ποιεῖσθαι λαβεῖν ἕκαστον 
αὐτῶν τί ἐστιν, εἶθ᾽ οὕτως περὶ τῶν ἐχομένων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιζητεῖν. εἰ 
δὲ χρὴ λέγειν τί ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, οἷον τί τὸ νοητικὸν ἢ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ἢ τὸ 
θρεπτικόν, πρότερον ἔτι λεκτέον τί τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τί τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι·»9 
«εἰ δὲ τρία ἡ ψυχή»10. 
(c) Ethica Nicomachea, Book I, Chapter 7, 1098 a 1-5:  
«ἀφοριστέον ἄρα τὴν τε θρεπτικὴν καὶ τὴν αὐξητικὴν ζωήν. ἑπομένη δὲ αἰσθητική 
τις ἂν εἴη· φαίνεται δὲ καὶ αὐτὴ κοινὴ καὶ ἵππῳ καὶ βοΐ καὶ παντὶ ζῴῳ. λείπεται 
δὴ πρακτική τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος· τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπιπειθὲς λόγῳ, τὸ δ᾽ ὡς 
ἔχον καὶ διανοούμενον»11. 
As it has been shown these faculties are: (a) the nutritive (θρεπτική), (b) the 
sensitive (αἰσθητική), and (c) the rational (νοητική) faculty/power of the soul.  
The nutritive faculty/power (θρεπτικὴ δύναμη) of the soul, being the same as 
the reproductive (γεννητική) («ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἡ αὐτὴ δύναμις τῆς ψυχῆς θρεπτικὴ καὶ 
                                                          
8
 Aristotle, De Generatione Animalium, II, 3, 736 b 8-14: «As regards nutritive Soul, then, it is clear 
that we must posit that semens and fetations which are not separated <from the parent> possess it 
potentially, though not in actuality—i.e., not until they begin to draw the nourishment to themselves 
and perform the function of nutritive Soul, as fetations which get separated <from the parent> do; for 
to begin with it seems that all things of this sort live the life of a plant. And it is clear we should follow 
a similar line also in our statements about sentient [or sensitive] Soul and rational Soul» trans. by A. 
Peck. 
9
 Aristotle, De Anima, II, 4, 415 a 14-18: «The enquirer who approaches this subject must ascertain 
what each of these faculties is before he proceeds to investigate the questions next in order and so 
forth. But if we are asked to state what each of these is; that is to say, what the rational, sensitive and 
nutritive faculties/powers respectively are, we must begin by stating what thinking is and what sense 
perception is» see R. D. Hicks. 
10
 Ibid., III, 9, 432 b 6-7: «and if the soul is tripartite».  
11
 Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, I, 7, 1098 a 1-5: «Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and 
growth. Next there would be a life of perception, but it also seems to be common even to the horse, the 
ox, and every animal. There remains, then, an active life of the element that has a rational principle; of 
this, one part has such a principle in the sense of being obedient to one, the other in the sense of 
possessing one and exercising thought» trans. by W. D. Ross. 
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γεννητική»)12, exists in all living beings, including plants and animals. It is the first 
and most common faculty of the soul and is essential to all livings beings. Its works 
are reproduction and nutrition («ἡ γὰρ θρεπτικὴ ψυχὴ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει, καὶ 
πρώτη καὶ κοινοτάτη δύναμίς ἐστι ψυχῆς, καθ᾽ ἣν ὑπάρχει τὸ ζῆν ἅπασιν. ἧς 
ἐστὶν ἔργα γεννῆσαι καὶ τροφῇ χρῆσθαι»)13. It does it’s own work better when the 
animal is asleep than when it is awake14. 
Next comes the sensitive faculty/power (αἰσθητική) of the soul, which exists in 
all animals. In plants there is no sensitive faculty/power apart from the nutritive. The 
sensitive part of the soul cannot exist without the nutritive, and it exists not in 
actuality (ἐνεργείᾳ), but only in potentiality (δυνάμει)15. 
Finally, species like man have in addition the rational (νοητικόν) οr discursive 
(διανοητικόν) faculty/power of the soul and the mind/intellect (νοῦς): 
«ἐνίοις δὲ πρὸς τούτοις ὑπάρχει καὶ τὸ κατὰ τόπον κινητικόν, ἑτέροις δὲ καὶ τὸ 
διανοητικόν τε καὶ νοῦς, οἷον ἀνθρώποις καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἢ 
τιμιώτερον»16. 
                                                          
12
 Aristotle, De Anima, II, 4, 416 a 19-20. 
13
 Ibid., II, 4, 415 a 23-26. 
14
 See also Aristotle, De Anima, II, 2, 413 b 7-8: «θρεπτικὸν δὲ λέγομεν τὸ τοιοῦτον μόριον τῆς 
ψυχῆς οὗ καὶ τὰ φυόμενα μετέχει», «by the nutritive part we mean that part of the soul which is 
common even to plants». Ibid., II, 3, 414 a 32-33: «ὑπάρχει δὲ τοῖς μὲν φυτοῖς τὸ θρεπτικὸν 
μόνον», «plants have only the nutritive part». Ibid., III, 9, 432 a 28-29: «τὸ τε θρεπτικόν, ὃ καὶ 
τοῖς φυτοῖς ὑπάρχει καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴοις», «the nutritive part, which belongs to plants and to all 
animals». Idem., Ethica Eudemia, II, 1, 1219 b 22-23: «ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐνεργεῖ τὸ 
θρεπτικὸν», «for the nutritive part functions more in sleep» etc. 
15
 See Aristotle, De Anima, II, 3, 414 a 32-414 b 1: «ὑπάρχει δὲ τοῖς μὲν φυτοῖς τὸ θρεπτικὸν 
μόνον, ἑτέροις δὲ τοῦτὸ τε καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν», «plants have only the nutritive part, while other 
[living beings] have this and in addition the sensitive part». Ibid., II, 3, 415 a 1-3: «ἄνευ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ 
θρεπτικοῦ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἔστιν· τοῦ δ᾽ αἰσθητικοῦ χωρίζεται τὸ θρεπτικὸν ἐν τοῖς 
φυτοῖς», «the sensitive part does not exist without the nutritive; but in plants the nutritive part exists 
without the sensitive». Ibid., II, 5, 417 a 6-7: «δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τὸ αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνεργείᾳ, 
ἀλλὰ δυνάμει μόνον», «it is clear that the sensitive part is in actuality not in potentiality». Idem., 
Ethica Eudemia, II, 1, 1219 b 23-24: «τὸ δ᾽ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ ὀρεκτικὸν ἀτελῆ ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ», «the 
sensitive and appetitive parts are ineffective/incomplete in sleep» etc. 
16
 Aristotle, De Anima, ΙΙ, 3, 414 b 16-19. 
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The ancient Aristotelian commentator, Philoponus, explains «διανοητικόν»17, 
namely the discursive faculty/power of the soul, as «δυνάμει νοῦς», namely as the 
«potential mind»: 
«ἑτέροις καὶ τὸ διανοητικόν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ δυνάμει νοῦς, οἷον ἐν ἀνθρώποις»18. 
The «potential mind» is analogous to the «passive mind», «which becomes all 
things» («τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι»)19. Apart from the «potential mind» there is also the 
«ἐνεργείᾳ or ἐντελεχείᾳ νοῦς» (actuality mind), which is analogous to the 
«ποιητικὸς νοῦς» (active mind). So, according to the previous remarks we could say 
that in line 414 b 18 of De Anima the term «νοῦς» («mind») probably refers to the 
«active mind», which is the superior part of the soul. This part of the soul is strongly 
related to the discursive (διανοητικόν) part of the soul, and their difference is 
indiscernible (indistinguishable). Consequently, when Aristotle says that «others have 
also the discursive faculty/power and mind» («ἑτέροις δὲ καὶ τὸ διανοητικόν τε καὶ 
νοῦς») he probably means that: (a) the discursive faculty/power is this part of the soul 
where the passive mind acts, and (b) the mind is the active mind, which is the superior 
part of the soul20. 
                                                          
17
 Ibid., II, 3, 414 b 18. 
18
 Ioannes Philoponus, Aristotelis de Anima, 15, 255, 4-5. 
19
 Aristotle, op. cit., III, 5, 430 a 14-15. The «passive mind», which is called by Simplicius (Idem., 
Aristotelis De Anima, 11, 242, 17-18: «Ὁ τοιοῦτος ὁ ὡς ὕλη· πρὸς γὰρ τὸ ἔσχατον ἀποδίδοται· 
καὶ ὅπως ὡς ὕλη, ἐδήλωσεν, ὅτι τῷ πάντα γίγνεσθαι») and Alexander of Aphrodisias (Idem., 
De Anima, 81, 24-25: «ὑλικὸς νοῦς καλεῖταί τε καὶ ἔστι (πᾶν γὰρ τὸ δεκτικόν τινος ὕλη 
ἐκείνου)») as «ὑλικὸς νοῦς» («mind which is like matter»), is a mind which becomes all the 
intelligible objects («τὰ νοητά»). And since this mind is like matter, and matter as Aristotle says is 
identical to potentiality (Aristotle, De Anima, II, 1, 412 a 9: «ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ μὲν ὕλη δύναμις»), then this 
mind is a «potential mind» («δυνάμει νοῦς»). This mind is receptive of the forms of the objects. It is 
a kind of substratum that receives the forms («εἴδη») of the intelligible objects. 
20
 In a certain chapter of my dissertation [see Christina S. Papachristou, The Cognitive Process in the 
Aristotelian Philosophy: Aἴσθησις (Sense), Αἴσθημα (Sensation), Φαντασία (Phantasia), 
Φάντασμα (Phantasma), Μνήμη (Memory), Μνημόνευμα (Mnemonic Image), Νοῦς (Mind), 
Νόημα (Noêma), Ph.D. Thesis (in Greek) (Thessaloniki: Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, 2008), 
Part 4, Ch. 3, pp. 273-300] I consider and I try to rebut several arguments that commentators have 
advanced in favor of the thesis that in De Anima, III, 5 Aristotle is referring to two distinct minds, 
which correspond to the human (παθητικὸς νοῦς) and the active mind (ποιητικὸς νοῦς), which is 
analogous, as certain Aristotelian scholars believe, to the divine mind. Besides that, I argue that this 
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Aristotle in lines 413 b 11-13 determines the soul according to the following 
faculties/powers, the nutritive, sensitive, discursive and locomotive: 
«νῦν δ᾽ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω μόνον, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ τῶν εἰρημένων τούτων 
ἀρχὴ καὶ τούτοις ὥρισται, θρεπτικῷ, αἰσθητικῷ, διανοητικῷ, κινήσει»21. 
As we can see in this passage, the philosopher adds another part or faculty of the soul, 
the locomotive (κίνησις ⇒ κινητικὸν κατὰ τόπον). This faculty is related to the 
local movement of animals and is also described as the «progressive motion» 
(«πορευτικὴ κίνησις»): 
«τί τὸ κινοῦν κατὰ τόπον τὸ ζῷόν ἐστιν;…ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς κατὰ τόπον κινήσεως, τί 
τὸ κινοῦν τὸ ζῷον τὴν πορευτικὴν κίνησιν, σκεπτέον»22 . 
In lines 414 a 31-32 Aristotle adds another faculty of the soul, the appetitive 
(ὀρεκτικόν): 
«δυνάμεις δ᾽ εἴπομεν θρεπτικόν, ὀρεκτικόν23, αἰσθητικόν, κινητικὸν κατὰ τόπον, 
διανοητικόν»24. 
And in lines 414 b 1-2 he says that: 
                                                                                                                                                                      
division is related to the duality of a single mind, and I put forward the view that this distinction could 
find its parallel in the distinction between the physical brain (the physical and biological matter 
contained within the skull) and the energetic function of thought [Charalambos S. Ierodiakonou, 
Psychological Issues in the Writings of Aristotle (in Greek) (Thessaloniki: Mastorides, 2004), p. 243]. 
Cf. also Christina S. Papachristou, «The Puzzling Role of the Brain in Aristotle’s Theory of Sense 
Perception», herausgeber von Jochen Althoff, Sabine Fφllinger, Georg Wöhrle, Antike 
Naturwissenschaft und ihre Rezeption, Band XVIII (Trier: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 2008), pp. 18-
19. 
21 Aristotle, De Anima, II, 2, 413 b 11-13.  
22
 Ibid., III, 9, 432 b 8-14. 
23
 See Ibid., III, 9, 432 b 3-4, «πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὸ ὀρεκτικόν, ὃ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ δυνάμει ἕτερον 
ἄν δόξειεν εἶναι πάντων», «In addition to these there is the appetitive faculty, which would seem to 
be different from all both in concept and in potentiality». Ibid., III, 10, 433 a 21: «ἓν δή τι τὸ κινοῦν 
τὸ ὀρεκτικόν», «Thus that which produces movement is one in kind, the appetitive faculty». Ibid., III, 
10, 433 b 27-29: «ὅλως μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ᾗ ὀρεκτικὸν τὸ ζῷον, ταύτῃ ἑαυτοῦ 
κινητικόν· ὀρεκτικὸν δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασίας·», «thus, in general, as we have already said, the 
animal is capable of movement itself so far as it is appetitive· and it cannot be appetitive without 
imagination». Idem., Ethica Eudemia, II, 1, 1219 b 23-24: «τὸ δ᾽ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ ὀρεκτικὸν ἀτελῆ 
ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ», «the sensitive and appetitive parts are ineffective/incomplete in sleep» etc.  
24
 Aristotle, De Anima, II, 3, 414 a 31-32. 
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«εἰ δὲ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, καὶ τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν· ὄρεξις μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμία καὶ θυμὸς καὶ 
βούλησις»25. 
The previous remark allows us to assert that the appetitive power (ὀρεκτικόν) is 
part of the sensitive power (αἰσθητικόν) or that the possession of the sensitive faculty 
involves the possession of the appetitive faculty. In other words, ὀρεκτικόν belongs 
to everything that has sensation.  
Elsewhere, specifically in lines 432 b 3-6, Aristotle says: 
«πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὸ ὀρεκτικόν, ὃ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ δυνάμει ἕτερον ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι 
πάντων. καὶ ἄτοπον δὴ τὸ τοῦτο διασπᾶν· ἔν τε τῷ λογιστικῷ γὰρ ἡ βούλησις 
γίνεται, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ ἡ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ θυμός·»26 
Therefore, the philosopher remarks here that the appetitive faculty is both rational 
(ἡ βούλησις, namely wish) and irrational (ἡ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ θυμός, namely desire 
and spiritedness). 
Aristotle in lines 432 a 28- 432 b 4 adds another part of the soul, the imaginative 
(φανταστικόν)27, which is distinct from the other parts (μόρια) or faculties 
(δυνάμεις), and it is difficult to say with which of the parts it is identical or not: 
                                                          
25
 Ibid., II, 3, 414 b 1-2: «and if any class of living things has the sensitive [faculty/power] it must also 
have the appetitive; where under appetite we include desire, spiritedness and wish». 
26
 Ibid., III, 9, 432 b 3-6: «In addition to these there is the appetitive faculty, which would seem to be 
different from all both in concept and in potentiality. And it is absurd to separate this; For in the 
rational part of the soul corresponds wish and in the irrational part of the soul desire and spiritedness». 
27
 See Aristotle, De Insomniis et De Divinatione per Somnun, I, 458 b 29-31: «ἀλλ᾽ εἴτε δὴ ταὐτὸν 
εἴθ᾽ ἕτερον τὸ φανταστικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, οὐδὲν ἧττον οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ τοῦ 
ὁρᾶν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαί τι·», «But whether the imaginative faculty of the soul and the sensitive are 
the same or different, nevertheless the affection does not occur without our seeing or perceiving 
something». Ibid., I, 459 a 14-22: «ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ φαντασίας ἐν τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς εἴρηται, καὶ ἔστι 
μὲν τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ τὸ φανταστικόν, τὸ δ᾽ εἶναι φανταστικῷ καὶ αἰσθητικῷ ἕτερον, 
ἔστι δὲ φαντασία ἡ ὑπὸ τῆς κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν αἰσθήσεως γινομένη κίνησις, τὸ δ᾽ ἐνύπνιον 
φάντασμά τι φαίνεται εἶναι (τὸ γὰρ ἐν ὕπνῳ φάντασμα ἐνύπνιον λέγομεν, εἴθ᾽ ἁπλῶς 
εἴτε τρόπον τινὰ γινόμενον), φανερὸν ὅτι τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ μέν ἐστι τὸ ἐνυπνιάζειν, τούτου 
δ᾽ ᾖ φανταστικόν», «And since phantasia has been discussed in [the treatise] on the soul, and the 
imaginative faculty is the same as the sensitive, though their function is different for the imaginative 
and the sensitive; and phantasia is the movement produced by the active sense, and the dream appears 
to be a kind of phantasma (for a phantasma which appears in sleep, is what we call a dream, whether it 
occurs simply or in a particular way), it is obvious that dreaming is the work of the sensitive faculty, 
but belongs to this faculty qua imaginative» see D. Gallop. 
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«περὶ ὧν καὶ νῦν εἴρηται, τό τε θρεπτικόν, ὃ καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς ὑπάρχει καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς 
ζῴοις, καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, ὃ οὔτε ὡς ἄλογον οὔτε ὡς λόγον ἔχον θείη ἄν τις 
ῥᾳδίως. ἔτι δὲ τὸ φανταστικόν, ὃ τῷ μὲν εἶναι πάντων ἕτερον, τίνι δὲ τούτων 
ταὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερον, ἔχει πολλὴν ἀπορίαν, εἴ τις θήσει κεχωρισμένα μόρια τῆς 
ψυχῆς. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὸ ὀρεκτικόν, ὃ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ δυνάμει ἕτερον ἂν δόξειεν 
εἶναι πάντων»28. 
Consequently, according to the previous analysis, the parts (μόρια) or faculties 
(δυνάμεις) of the soul—«with an order of succession within…living beings…going 
from the most widely shared to the less widely shared capacities»29—can be summed 
up in the following table: 
Aristotle’s Division of the Parts or Faculties/Powers of the Soul 
1. Nutritive (Θρεπτικόν) or Reproductive (Γεννητικόν) 
2. Appetitive (desire, spiritedness, wish) [Ὀρεκτικόν (ἐπιθυμία, θυμός, βούλησις)] 
3. Sensitive (Αἰσθητικόν) 
4. Locomotive/Motive according to place (Κινητικὸν κατὰ τόπον) 
5. Imaginative (Φανταστικόν) 
6. (a) Rational (Νοητικόν) or Discursive (Διανοητικόν)30 ⇒ Passive Mind (Παθητικὸς 
Νοῦς) 
                                                          
28
 Aristotle, De Anima, III, 9, 432 a 28-432 b 4: «those [parts] which we have just discussed, the 
nutritive, which belongs both to plants and to all animals, and the sensitive, which could not easily be 
classed either as irrational or rational. There is also the imaginative, which is different from all of them, 
while it is very difficult to say with which of them it is identical or not identical, if someone will set up 
separate parts of the soul. In addition to these there is the appetitive, which would seem to be different 
from all both in concept and in potentiality». 
29
 Ronald Polansky (ed.), Aristotle’s De Anima: A Critical Commentary (Cambridge, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 9. 
30
 For a useful analysis of the meanings νοητικόν and διανοητικόν cf. Klaus Oehler, Die Lehre vom 
Noetischen und Dianoetischen Denken bei Platon und Aristoteles: Ein Beitrag zur Erforschung der 
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                                                                                                                   ⇑ 
    (b) Mind (Νοῦς) ⇒ the Active Mind (Ποιητικὸς Νοῦς) acts on the Passive Mind 
Table 1 
II. Phantasia (Φαντασία) and Phantasma (Φάντασμα) in De Anima III, 331 
It is generally agreed that Aristotle analyses the function of phantasia 
(φαντασία)32 and its relation to phantasmata (φαντάσματα) in his psychological 
treatises33. Phantasia (φαντασία)34 is the main subject of discussion in De Anima ΙΙΙ, 
335. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Geschichte des Bewussteinsproblems in der Antike (München: Zetemata, Heft 29, C. H. Beck, 1962), 
pp. 131-244. 
31
 An earlier version of this topic was presented at the 35th Annual Conference of the Panhellenic 
Association of Philologist: Aristotle: Leading Teacher and Thinker (October 6-8, 2008, Benaki 
Museum, Athens). Cf. Christina S. Papachristou, «The Influence of the Aristotelian Theory of 
Phantasia in the Stoic Philosophy and in the Scientific Work of George J. Romanes» (in Greek), in 
Anastasios Stephos – Spiros Touliatos (eds.), Seminar 36: Aristotle: Leading Teacher and Thinker, 
(Athens: Ellinoekdotiki, Panhellenic Association of Philologist, 2009), pp. 72-89. 
32
 Even though the Greek word ‘phantasia’ is usually translated it as ‘imagination’, I prefer to leave the 
word untranslated. I believe that the word ‘imagination’ does not convey Aristotle’s notion of 
‘phantasia’ as honestly and as understandably as possible.  
33
 Aristotle’s psychological treatises are De Anima (Περὶ Ψυχῆς) and Parva Naturalia (Μικρὰ 
Φυσικά). The Parva Naturalia is a collection of short treatises: (1) De Sensu et Sensibilibus (Περὶ 
Αἰσθήσεως καὶ Αἰσθητῶν). (2) De Memoria et Reminiscentia (Περὶ Μνήμης καὶ 
Ἀναμνήσεως). (3) De Somno et Vigilia (Περὶ Ὕπνου καὶ Ἐγρηγόρσεως). (4) De Insomniis (Περὶ 
Ἐνυπνίων). (5) De Divinatione per Somnun (Περὶ τῆς Καθ᾽ Ὕπνου Μαντικῆς). (6) De 
Longitudine et Brevitate Vitae (Περὶ Μακροβιότητος καὶ Βραχυβιότητος). (7) De Iuventute et 
Senectute (Περὶ Νεότητος καὶ Γήρως). (8) De Vita et Morte (Περὶ Ζωῆς καὶ Θανάτου). (9) De 
Respiratione (Περὶ Ἀναπνοῆς). In addition the Stageirite philosopher investigates briefly several 
psychological phenomena in his political [e.g. Politica (Πολιτικά)], metaphysical [e.g. Metaphysica 
(Μετὰ τὰ Φυσικά)], ethical [e.g. Ethica Nicomachea (Ἠθικὰ Νικομάχεια)], and biological [e.g. 
De Motu Animalium (Περὶ Ζῴων Κινήσεως)] treatises.  
34
 Some indicative readings for the Aristotelian notion of phantasia are listed below: Jakob 
Freudenthal, Ueber den Begriff des Wortes Φαντασία bei Aristoteles (Göttingen: 1863). David A. 
Rees, «Aristotle’s Treatment of Φαντασία», in J. P. Anton and G. L. Kustas (eds.), Essays in Ancient 
Greek Philosophy, (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1971), pp. 491-504. 
Malcolm Schofield, «Aristotle on Imagination», in G. E. R. Lloyd and G. E. L. Owen (eds.), Aristotle 
on Mind and the Senses: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Aristotelicum [Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1978 (19751)], pp. 99-140. Joyce Engmann, «Imagination and Truth in Aristotle», 
Journal of the History of Philosophy 14 (1976): pp. 259-65. Martha C. Nussbaum, «The Role of 
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«εἰ δή ἐστιν ἡ φαντασία καθ᾽ ἣν λέγομεν φάντασμά τι ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι»36. 
According to the contemporary view of ‘imagination’ – phantasia – we define 
‘imagination’ as the capacity or power of the mind to create, to recombine or 
reproduce and to call up mental images of objects, events, faces or scenes, which are 
not present to the senses37. 
Aristotle’s concept of phantasia in comparison to the contemporary concept of 
‘imagination’ has a wider meaning. David Ross, in his book entitled Aristotle, lists the 
main functions of phantasia as: (a) the formation of after-images; (b) memory 
(μνήμη); (c) recollection (ἀνάμνησις); (d) dreams (ἐνύπνια); (e) in relation to desire 
(ἐπιθυμία); (f) in relation to thought (τὸ νοητικόν)38. 
According to Malcolm Schofield «it was Aristotle who gave the first extended 
analytical description of imagining as a distinct faculty of the soul»39 [imaginative 
part (τὸ φανταστικὸν μόριον)], which cannot be independent of the body: 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Phantasia in Aristotle’s Explanation of Action», in Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium: Text with 
Translation, Commentary, and Interpretative Essays by Martha C. Nussbaum (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 221-269. Kevin White, «The Meaning of Phantasia in 
Aristotle’s De Anima, III, 3-8», Dialogue 24 (1985): pp. 483-505. Deborah K. W. Modrak, «Phantasia 
Reconsidered», Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 66 (1986): pp. 47-69. Michael V. Wedin, Mind 
and Imagination in Aristotle (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1988). Dorothea Frede, 
«The Cognitive Role of Phantasia in Aristotle», in M. C. Nussbaum and A. O. Rorty (eds.), Essays on 
Aristotle’s De Anima, [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996 (19921)], pp. 279-295. Victor Caston, «Why 
Aristotle Needs Imagination», Phronesis 41, Number 1 (1996): pp. 20-55. Kenneth Turnbull, «De 
Anima iii 3*», in L. P. Gerson (ed.), Aristotle: Critical Assessments, Vol. I: Psychology and Ethics, 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 83-120 etc. 
35
 Castoriadis argues that «Aristotle discovers the imagination philosophically – phantasia – but what 
he says about it thematically, when he treats it ex professo (fixing the imagination in its alleged place, 
between sensation, of which it would be a reproduction, and intellection, thereby governing for 25 
centuries what everybody thinks about it) is of little consequence next to what he has truly to say about 
it, which he says elsewhere, and which he has no way of reconciling with what he thinks about phusis, 
the soul, thinking and being». See Cornelius Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, 
translated by Kathleen Blarney [Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998 (19751)], pp. 174-175. 
36
 Aristotle, De Anima, III, 3, 428 a 1-2: «phantasia is the faculty/power by which a phantasma 
[(mental) representation] is presented to us». 
37
 See Ted Honderich (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Oxford, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), p. 395. 
38
 See Sir David Ross, Aristotle, with a new introduction by John L. Ackrill [New York: Routledge, 
1995 (19231)], pp. 90-91. 
39
 Malcolm Schofield, «Aristotle on Imagination», in G. E. R. Lloyd and G. E. L. Owen (eds.), 
Aristotle on Mind and the Senses: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Aristotelicum [Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1978 (19751)], p. 99. 
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«μάλιστα δ᾽ ἔοικεν ἴδιον τὸ νοεῖν· εἰ δ᾽ ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτο φαντασία τις ἢ μὴ ἄνευ 
φαντασίας, οὐκ ἐνδέχοιτ᾽ ἂν οὐδὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἄνευ σώματος εἶναι»40.  
Aristotle remarks that phantasia (φαντασία) is different from sensation 
(αἴσθησις), and thought (διάνοια)41. And that means that Aristotle’s conception of 
phantasia differs from that of Plato’s Sophist. In other words, phantasia for Aristotle 
is not «a mixture of sensation and judgement» («σύμμειξις αἰσθήσεως καὶ δόξης»), 
as Plato believed42. Also the Stageirite philosopher asserts that phantasia (φαντασία) 
is a kind of motion (κίνησις) in the soul that cannot exist apart from sensation 
(αἴσθησις) —it is caused by the activity of sensation43— and supposition 
(ὑπόληψις), and the term ‘ὑπόληψις’, as Philoponus notes, includes «knowledge, 
right thinking/practical wisdom and opinion» («ὑπόληψις κατ᾽ ἐπιστήμης καὶ 
φρονήσεως καὶ δόξης λέγεται»)44. Phantasia, according to Aristotle, is an affection 
(πάθος) and «this affection is in our own power whenever we wish». So, it is up to us 
to imagine, but it is not up to us to believe, «for the belief that we hold must be either 
false or true»: 
«φαντασία γὰρ ἕτερον καὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ διανοίας· αὐτή τε οὐ γίγνεται ἄνευ 
αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ἄνευ ταύτης οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπόληψις45. ὅτι δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ αὐτὴ νόησις 
                                                          
40
 Aristotle, De Anima, I, 1, 403 a 8-10: «Thinking seems to be peculiar to the soul; But if thinking is a 
kind of phantasia, then it would not be possible even for thinking to be independent of the body». 
41
 Ibid., III, 3, 427 b 14-15. 
42
 See Plato, Sophist, 264 a 4-264 b 3: «{ΞΕ.} Τὶ δ᾽ ὅταν μὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἀλλὰ δι᾽ αἰσθήσεως παρῇ 
τινι, τὸ τοιοῦτον αὖ πάθος ἆρ᾽ οἷόν τε ὀρθῶς εἰπεῖν ἕτερόν τι πλῆν φαντασίαν; {ΘΕΑΙ.} 
Οὐδέν. {ΞΕ.} Οὐκοῦν ἐπείπερ λόγος ἀληθὴς ἦν καὶ ψευδής, τούτων δ᾽ ἐφάνη διάνοια μὲν 
αὐτῆς πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ψυχῆς διάλογος, δόξα δὲ διανοίας ἀποτελεύτησις, «φαίνεται» δὲ ὃ 
λέγομεν σύμμειξις αἰσθήσεως καὶ δόξης, ἀνάγκη δὴ καὶ τούτων τῷ λόγῳ συγγενῶν 
ὄντων ψευδῆ [τε] αὐτῶν ἔνια καὶ ἐνίοτε εἶναι». 
43
 Aristotle, De Anima, ΙΙΙ, 3, 428 b 11-13: «ἡ δὲ φαντασία κίνησίς τις δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ 
αἰσθήσεως γίγνεσθαι ἀλλ᾽ αἰσθανομένοις καὶ ὧν αἴσθησίς ἐστιν». Ibid., III, 3, 429 a 1-2. 
Phantasia is a type of motion that arises by actual sensation. Sensation is activated by the presence of 
the external object.  
44
 Ioannes Philoponus, Aristotelis de Anima, 15, 492, 12. 
45
 The term «ὑπόληψις» has puzzled many Aristotelian scholars. For example Philoponus, as we have 
already noticed, says that «ὑπόληψις κατ᾽ ἐπιστήμης καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ δόξης λέγεται». 
Robert D. Hicks notices that «ὑπόληψις» and «διάνοια» are closely related, «for in 429 a 23 
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καὶ ὑπόληψις, φανερόν. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τὸ πάθος ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐστίν, ὅταν 
βουλώμεθα46 (πρὸ ὀμμάτων γὰρ ἔστι τι ποιήσασθαι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς 
μνημονικοῖς τιθέμενοι καὶ εἰδωλοποιοῦντες)47, δοξάζειν δ᾽ οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν· ἀνάγκη 
γὰρ ἢ ψεύδεσθαι ἢ ἀληθεύειν»48.  
In this passage it is important the phrase «πρὸ ὀμμάτων γὰρ ἔστι τι 
ποιήσασθαι»49, which means our ability to voluntarily («ὅταν βουλώμεθα») set 
before our eyes mental images, as do those who use memorization techniques, which 
are based on sight and the powers of visualization. Therefore, phantasia in the above 
passage seems to be associated or even identified with visual imagery, that is, the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
ὑπολαμβάνει is obviously added to explain διανοεῖται [«(λέγω δὲ νοῦν ᾧ διανοεῖται καὶ 
ὑπολαμβάνει ἡ ψυχὴ)»]…The term ὑπόληψις is not a technical term, and is chosen here because it 
will include ἐπιστήμη, δόξα, and φρόνησις» [see Aristotle, De Anima, with translation, introduction 
and notes by Robert D. Hicks [New York: Arno Press, 1976 (19071)], p. 457]. David W. Hamlyn 
asserts that the word ὑπόληψις «is a difficult word to translate since it appears to express a very 
general notion which functions somewhat as the notion of judgement did in the writings of the 
Absolute Idealists…» [see Aristotle, De Anima, Books II and III (with certain passages from Book I), 
translated with introduction and notes by D. W. Hamlyn, Clarendon Aristotle Series (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1968), p. 130]. David W. Hamlyn and Ronald Polansky [see Ronald Polansky, op. 
cit., 2007), p. 411] translate the word ὑπόληψις as «supposition». For further discussion and 
definition of the term «ὑπόληψις» see Françoise Caujolle-Zaslawsky, «L’ Emploi d’ Hupolèpsis dans 
le De Anima, III, 3», sous la direction de Gilbert Romeyer-Dherbey, etudes réunies par Cristina Viano, 
Corps et Âme: Sur le De Anima d’ Aristote (Paris: J. Vrin, 1996), pp. 349-365. 
46
 Aristotle in lines 427 b 17-18 of the treatise De Anima says that «this affection [namely phantasia] is 
in our power, whenever we wish». But Aristotle’s concept of phantasia is connected not only with 
mental images formed in the course of waking thought, but also with dream images (ἐνύπνια) formed 
while we are asleep. And while we are asleep, as Aristotle remarks, perception and judgement do not 
occur. Therefore, dream images, which are one of the works of phantasia, do not occur whenever we 
wish (see De Insomniis, I, 459 a 15-23 and III, 462 a 27-31). 
47
 Aristotle by the phrase «those who set things out in mnemonic systems» («οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημονικοῖς 
τιθέμενοι») he probably means those who used Mnemonics, the mnemonic art, which was invented 
by a Greek lyric poet, Simonides of Ceos (556-469 B.C.).  
48
 Aristotle, De Anima, III, 3 427 b 14-21: «Because phantasia is different from sensation and thought; 
this [namely phantasia] cannot exist apart from sensation and supposition. It is manifest that 
[phantasia] is not the same kind of thinking as supposal. For this affection is in our own power 
whenever we wish (for it is possible to represent an object before our eyes, as do those who set things 
out in mnemonic systems and form [mental] images of them), but believing/forming opinions is not in 
our own power; For it is necessary to be either false or true». 
49
 Vasileios Tatakis translates the passage «πρὸ ὀμμάτων γὰρ ἔστι τι ποιήσασθαι» as «for it is 
possible to represent an object before the soul’s eye». He justifies the translation of «πρὸ ὀμμάτων» 
as «before the soul’s eye» by citing the passage «ἡ δ᾽ ἕξις τῷ ὄμματι τούτῳ γίνεται τῆς ψυχῆς», 
namely, «and this eye of the soul acquires its formed state» (Ethica Nicomachea, VI, 13, 1144 a 29-
30). 
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ability to form mental images, or to ‘see with the mind’s eye’. For example, if 
someone asks us to describe in detail a lion that is not physically present, we will 
probably find ourselves ‘looking at’ or ‘visualizing’ lions with ‘our mind’s eye’. 
Moreover, I would like to note that we should be very careful about how we 
interpret the product of the faculty of phantasia, φάντασμα, in the Aristotelian texts. 
My suggestion is that the word «φάντασμα», which is mentioned twelve times in De 
Anima50, may conveniently and aptly be translated as: (a) «representation» or 
«image» in contexts where «φάντασμα» is related only with the faculty of phantasia 
(e.g. «εἰ δή ἐστιν ἡ φαντασία καθ᾽ ἣν λέγομεν φάντασμά τι ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι»)51, 
and (b) as «mental representation» or «mental image», when «φάντασμα» is 
described by the philosopher as the substratum upon which the mind works (e.g. «(διὸ 
οὐδέποτε νοεῖ ἄνευ φαντάσματος ἡ ψυχή)»)52. 
 
 
IIΙ. Indefinite/Indeterminate (Ἀόριστος), Sensitive (Αἰσθητική) and Calculative or 
Deliberative (Λογιστική or Βουλευτική) Phantasia (Φαντασία) 
 
 
On the basis of Aristotle’s discussion concerning the role and function of 
phantasia in certain chapters and passages of the treatise De Anima, we could say that 
                                                          
50
 The word «φάντασμα» is mentioned twelve times in the treatise De Anima. See Aristotle, De 
Anima, III, 3, 428 a 1-2: «εἰ δή ἐστιν ἡ φαντασία καθ᾽ ἣν λέγομεν φάντασμά τι ἡμῖν 
γίγνεσθαι». Op. cit., III, 7, 431 a 14-17: «τῇ δὲ διανοητικῇ ψυχῇ τὰ φαντάσματα οἷον 
αἰσθήματα ὑπάρχει. ὅταν δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν φήσῃ ἢ ἀποφήσῃ, φεύγει ἢ διώκει (διὸ 
οὐδέποτε νοεῖ ἄνευ φαντάσματος ἡ ψυχή)». Op. cit., III, 7, 431 b 2-8: «τὰ μὲν οὖν εἴδη τὸ 
νοητικὸν ἐν τοῖς φαντάσμασι νοεῖ, καὶ ὡς ἐν ἐκείνοις ὥρισται αὐτῷ τὸ διωκτὸν καὶ 
φευκτόν, καὶ ἐκτὸς τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ὅταν ἐπὶ τῶν φαντασμάτων ᾖ, κινεῖται· οἷον 
αἰσθανόμενος τὸν φρυκτὸν ὅτι πῦρ, [τῇ κοινῇ] γνωρίζει, ὁρῶν κινούμενον, ὅτι πολέμιος. 
ὁτὲ δὲ τοῖς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ φαντάσμασιν ἢ νοήμασιν ὥσπερ ὀρῶν λογίζεται καὶ βουλεύεται τὰ 
μέλλοντα πρὸς τὰ παρόντα». Op. cit., III, 8, 432 a 8-14: «ὅταν τε θεωρῇ, ἀνάγκη ἅμα 
φαντάσματι θεωρεῖν· τὰ γὰρ φαντάσματα ὥσπερ αἰσθήματά ἐστι, πλὴν ἄνευ ὕλης. ἔστι δ᾽ 
ἡ φαντασία ἕτερον φάσεως καὶ ἀποφάσεως· συμπλοκὴ γὰρ νοημάτων ἐστὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἢ 
ψεῦδος. τὰ δὲ πρῶτα νοήματα τίνι διοίσει τοῦ μὴ φαντάσματα εἶναι; ἢ οὐδὲ τἆλλα 
φαντάσματα, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασμάτων». Op. cit., III, 11, 434 a 9-10: «ὥστε δύναται ἓν ἐκ 
πλειόνων φαντασμάτων ποιεῖν)». 
51
 Aristotle, op. cit., III, 3, 428 a 1-2. 
52
 Ibid., III, 7, 431 a 16-17. 
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the philosopher distinguishes three kinds or grades of phantasia (φαντασία): (a) 
indefinite/indeterminate (ἀόριστος), (b) sensitive (αἰσθητική) and (c) calculative 
(λογιστική) or deliberative (βουλευτική) phantasia. Let us now examine each one of 
these kinds or grades of phantasia in more detail. 
(a)  Indefinite/Indeterminate Phantasia (Ἀόριστος Φαντασία) 
«Σκεπτέον δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀτελῶν, τί τὸ κινοῦν ἐστίν, οἷς ἁφὴ μόνον ὑπάρχει 
αἴσθησις, πότερον ἐνδέχεται φαντασίαν ὑπάρχειν τούτοις, ἢ οὔ,...φαντασία δὲ 
πῶς ἂν ἐνείη; ἢ ὥσπερ καὶ κινεῖται ἀορίστως, καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἔνεστι μέν, ἀορίστως δ᾽ 
ἔνεστιν»53.  
Certain Aristotelian commentators have interpreted the passage cited above as 
follows: Themistius explains that imperfect animals (τὰ ἀτελέστερα ζῶα), which are 
the lowest forms of animals, have phantasia, but in an inarticulate (ἀδιάρθωτον) and 
confused (συγκεχυμένην) way: 
«φαντάζεται ἀορίστως, ὥστε ἔχει μὲν φαντασίαν, ἀδιάρθωτον δὲ καὶ 
συγκεχυμένην»54. 
Philoponus says that zoophytes (animals that resemble plants)55 have an 
indefinite kind of phantasia, because the movements of these creatures are 
indeterminate: 
«ἐν τοῖς ζῳοφύτοις, φησίν, ἀορίστως ἐστὶν ἡ φαντασία, ὡς δηλοῖ τὸ ἀόριστον τῆς 
κινήσεως αὐτῶν. ἀόριστον δὲ καλεῖ τῶν ζῳοφύτων τὴν κίνησιν διὰ τὸ μὴ ὁμοίως 
συστέλλεσθαί τε καὶ διαστέλλεσθαι, ἀλλά ποτε μὲν μᾶλλον, ποτὲ δὲ ἧττον· ἢ 
ἀορίστως λέγει ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀμυδρῶς καὶ πεπλανημένως»56. 
                                                          
53
 Ibid., III, 11, 433 b 31-434 a 5: «We must also consider what it is that produces movement in the 
imperfect animals, which have no sense but touch, whether they have phantasia or not,… But how 
could they have phantasia? Or is it that as their movements are indefinite/indeterminate, they have 
phantasia…but indefinitely?» based on D. W. Hamlyn’s translation, but with some alterations. 
54
 Themistius, Libros Aristotelis de Anima Paraphrasis, 5, 3, 122, 11-12: «they imagine 
indeterminately, and so they have phantasia, but in an inarticulate and confused form». 
55
 Zoophytes or animal plants, such as corals, sea anemones and sponges, molluscs etc. are the lowest 
forms of animals. 
56
 Philoponus, Aristotelis de Anima, 15, 592, 26-29. 
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Thomas Aquinas explains that imperfect animals (animalia imperfecta) possess 
an indeterminate phantasia (phantasia indeterminata). This phantasia is 
indeterminate because the motion of phantasia (motus phantasiae) does not remain in 
this kind of creatures after the sense object is gone:  
«Videtur tamen hoc esse contrarium ei quod supra dixerat: quia si pars decisa habet sensum et 
appetitum, habet etiam phantasiam; si tamen phantasia est idem cum imaginatione, ut videtur. 
Dicendum est igitur, quod animalia imperfecta, ut in tertio dicetur, habent quidem 
phantasiam, sed indeterminatam, quia scilicet motus phantasiae non remanet in eis post 
apprehensionem sensus: in animalibus autem perfectis remanet motus phantasiae, etiam 
abeuntibus sensibilibus. Et secundum hoc, dicitur hic quod imaginatio non est eadem omnibus 
animalibus. Sed quaedam animalia sunt, quae hac sola vivunt, carentia scilicet intellectu, et 
directa in suis operationibus per imaginationem, sicut nos dirigimur per intellectum»57. 
From the above analysis we conclude that imperfect or indefinite creatures, 
which have no sense except that of touch58, possess an indefinite/indeterminate kind 
of phantasia. Representations of touch59 (phantasmata) or tactile representations are 
the products of this kind of phantasia. In imperfect animals tactile representations are 
usually diffuse and indefinite, and do not remain in them, after the sense object is 
gone60 (see table 2). 
 
 
                                                          
57
 Sancti Thomae de Aquino, Corpus Thomisticum. Sentencia Libri De Anima, Liber II, textum Taurini 
1959 editum ac automato translatum a Roberto Busa SJ in taenias magneticas denuo recognovit 
Enrique Alarcón atque instruxit <http://www. corpusthomisticum.org/can2.html>: «Nevertheless, this 
seems to be contrary to what he said above; because if a part cut off has sense and appetite, it also has 
phantasy; provided that phantasy is the same as imagination, as it seems. It must be said, therefore, that 
imperfect animals, as is said in the third book, do really have phantasy, but it is one which is 
indeterminate because the motion of phantasy does not remain in them after the apprehension of the 
sense; however in perfect animals the motion of phantasy remains even after the sensible thing is gone. 
And according to this it is said here that imagination is not the same for all animals. But there are 
certain animals which live by this alone, lacking the intellect and being directed in their operations by 
imagination, just as we are directed by the intellect» trans. by R. A Kocourek. 
58
 Imperfect creatures cannot sense objects at a distance, but only the percepts of touch. Polansky 
asserts that the word «ἁφή in 434 a 1 may apply to both [touch and taste]» [see Ronald Polansky, op. 
cit., p. 527]. 
59
 I translate phantasmata that are generated by the sense of touch, as representations of touch or tactile 
representations. The same applies to the rest of the senses, e.g. representations of taste, sight, smell and 
hearing. 
60
 They lack the capacity for retaining sensory impressions (phantasmata). 
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Imperfect Animals 
(zoophytes, molluscs etc.) 
⇓ 
Only the Contact Sense = they can sense only objects in contact with them and in this 
way they can discriminate which objects are pleasant or unpleasant to them 
⇓ 
Indefinite/Indeterminate Phantasia 
⇓ 
Phantasmata (Representations of Touch or Tactile Representations) = diffuse and 
indefinite and do not remain in imperfect animals after the sense object is gone  
Table 2 
(b) Sensitive Phantasia (Αἰσθητικὴ Φαντασία) 
Regarding the next kind or grade of phantasia, we should remark the following: 
Aristotle says that sensitive phantasia is generated by sense perception 
(αἰσθάνεσθαι). It does not occur without sense perception. Such kind of phantasia is 
found in all animals other than man (see Aristotle’s classification of animals, table 4), 
namely the irrational animals: 
«ταύτης μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα μετέχει»61. 
«ἡ μὲν οὖν αἰσθητικὴ φαντασία, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις 
ὑπάρχει»62. 
At this point we can pose the question: If such kind of phantasia is shared by all 
animals, even the ‘imperfect’ ones, then, what will be the difference between the 
indefinite (ἀόριστος) and sensitive (αἰσθητική) kind of phantasia? We shall return to 
this question later. 
                                                          
61
 Aristotle, op. cit., III, 10, 433 b 29-30: «So in the later [sensitive phantasia] and other animals 
partake». 
62
 Ibid., III, 11, 434 a 5-7: «Sensitive phantasia, then, as it has been said, exists also in the other 
animals». 
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In order to fully understand what the Stageirite philosopher is saying about 
sensitive phantasia (αἰσθητικὴ φαντασία) and as we shall examine later about 
calculative or deliberative phantasia (λογιστικὴ ἢ βουλευτικὴ φαντασία), it is 
necessary first to explain some of his views related to desire (ἐπιθυμία) and animal 
movement (κίνησις). Aristotle identifies two kinds of desire (ἐπιθυμία). David Ross 
says that «desire, however, is of two kinds, wish [βούλησις] or rational desire, which 
desires the good, and appetite [ὄρεξις] or irrational desire, which desires the apparent 
good. Or, to put the antithesis otherwise, wish is for future good, appetite for present 
pleasure mistaken for absolute pleasure and absolute good»63: 
«ἡ γὰρ βούλησις ὄρεξις·...ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ὄρεξίς τίς ἐστιν»64. 
The Stageirite philosopher stresses that appetite is the cause of movement or the 
moving power in animals: 
«(κινεῖται γὰρ τὸ κινούμενον ᾗ ὀρέγεται, καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις κίνησίς τίς ἐστιν ἢ 
ἐνέργεια), τὸ δὲ κινούμενον τὸ ζῷον· ᾧ δὲ κινεῖ ὀργάνῳ ἡ ὄρεξις, ἤδη τοῦτο 
σωματικόν ἐστιν·»65 
Also, in another perhaps important remark Aristotle specifically notes that 
animals cannot be appetitive without phantasia («ὀρεκτικὸν δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ 
φαντασίας·»)66. Appetite moves the animal but not without the mediation of 
phantasia. And this kind of phantasia is what the philosopher calls sensitive 
phantasia. 
Very slight traces of sensitive phantasia are found in indefinite animals, since 
these creatures have the capacity to perceive objects that are in contact with them and 
in this way they can discriminate which objects are pleasant or unpleasant to them. 
But they cannot sense objects at a distance, and as Aquinas says «the motion of 
                                                          
63
 Sir David Ross, op. cit., p. 91. 
64
 Aristotle, op. cit., III, 10, 433 a 23-26: «For wish is appetite;…for desire is a form of appetite». 
65
 Ibid., III, 10, 433 b 17-19: «(for the animal which is set in motion is set in motion in so far as it 
desires, and desire is a kind of motion or actuality), and that which is set in motion is the animal; and 
the instrument by which desire moves it is something bodily». 
66
 Ibid., III, 10, 433 b 28-29. 
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phantasy does not remain in them after the apprehension of the sense»67. However in 
animals other than indefinite creatures, in other words in animals that possess more 
than one sense (normal animals), and for this reason they can discriminate even the 
objects at a distance, the product of phantasia or phantasma remains in them even 
after the sense object is gone. Therefore, the difference between the indefinite and 
sensitive kind or grade of phantasia is based on their capacity to perceive and retain a 
sense object (see table 3). 
Irrational Animals 
⇓ 
Senses of Taste, Touch, Smell, Sight and Hearing = they can sense: (a) objects in 
contact with them, and (b) objects at a non contact-distance with them 
⇓ 
Sensitive Phantasia 
⇓ 
Phantasmata (Images/Representations of Taste, Touch, Smell, Sight and Hearing) = 
these animals have the ability to retain phantasmata after the sense object is gone 
Table 3 
Finally there is a passage in De Anima that has puzzled many ancient 
commentators and contemporary scholars. Aristotle in Book III, Chapter 3, says that 
the ant, the bee and the scolex do not have phantasia: 
«εἶτα αἴσθησις μὲν ἀεὶ πάρεστι, φαντασία δ᾽ οὔ. εἰ δὲ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ αὐτό, πᾶσιν 
ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο τοῖς θηρίοις φαντασίαν ὑπάρχειν· δοκεῖ δ᾽ οὔ, οἷον μύρμηκι ἢ 
μελίττῃ ἢ σκώληκι»68. 
David W. Hamlyn says that this passage «is puzzling since it is doubtful whether 
Aristotle would have denied imagination to ants and bees»69. I agree with Hamlyn’s 
                                                          
67
 St. Thomas Aquinas, The Commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas on Aristotle’s Treatise On the Soul, 
translated by R. A. Kocourek (St. Paul, Minnesota: College of St. Thomas, 1946), p. 19. 
68
 Aristotle, op. cit., III, 3, 428 a 8-11: «And then sense is always present, but not phantasia. But if 
[phantasia] was the same in actuality [with sense], it would be possible for all beasts to have 
phantasia; but it seems not to be the case; as the ant, the bee and the scolex». 
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remark and I argue that it is not possible for Aristotle to deny some kind of phantasia 
to the ants and the bees, since:70  
(a) in Historia Animalium I, 1 488 a 7-10 he includes ants and bees among the 
political animals: 
«Πολιτικὰ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὧν ἕν τι καὶ κοινὸν γίνεται πάντων τὸ ἔργον· ὅπερ οὐ πάντα 
ποιεῖ τὰ ἀγελαῖα. Ἔστι δὲ τοιοῦτον ἄνθρωπος, μέλιττα, σφήξ, μύρμηξ, 
γερανός»71. 
(b) in De Partibus Animalium II, 2, 648 a 6-7 he says that bees are more intelligent 
than many other animals: 
«διὸ καὶ μέλιτται καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ζῷα φρονιμώτερα τὴν φύσιν ἐστὶν ἐναίμων 
πολλῶν»72. 
(c) in Metaphysica I, 1, 980 b 22-25 he notices that bees are prudent/intelligent and 
have memory: 
«φύσει μὲν οὖν αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα γίγνεται τὰ ζῷα, ἐκ δὲ ταύτης τοῖς μὲν αὐτῶν 
οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται μνήμη, τοῖς δ᾽ ἐγγίγνεται. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ταῦτα φρονιμώτερα καὶ 
μαθητικώτερα τῶν μὴ δυναμένων μνημονεύειν ἐστί, φρόνιμα μὲν ἄνευ τοῦ 
μανθάνειν ὅσα μὴ δύναται τῶν ψόφων ἀκούειν (οἷον μέλιττα κἂν εἴ τι τοιοῦτον 
ἄλλο γένος ζῴων ἔστι), μανθάνει δ᾽ ὅσα πρὸς τῇ μνήμῃ καὶ ταύτην ἔχει τὴν 
αἴσθησιν»73. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
69
 See Aristotle, De Anima, Books II and III (with certain passages from Book I), translated with 
introduction and notes by David W. Hamlyn, Clarendon Aristotle Series (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1968), p. 54. 
70
 Cf. Aristotle, De Anima, with translation, introduction and notes by Robert D. Hicks [New York: 
Arno Press, 1976 (19071)], pp. 462-463. 
71
 Aristotle, Historia Animalium I, 1, 488 a 7-10: «Political animals are those that have one and 
common activity for all; and that thing is not in effect for all the gregarious animals. Such political 
animals are the human being, the bee, the wax, the ant and the crane». 
72
 Idem., De Partibus Animalium, II, 2, 648 a 6-7: «wherefore bees and other such as these animals are 
of a more prudent/intelligent nature than many blooded animals». 
73
 Idem., Metaphysica I, 1, 980 a 27-980 b 25: «Now animals are by nature born with the power of 
sensation and from this some acquire the faculty of memory, whereas others do not. Accordingly the 
former are more intelligent and capable of learning than those, which cannot remember. Such as cannot 
hear sounds (as the bee, and any other similar type of creature) are intelligent, but cannot learn; those 
only are capable of learning which possess this sense in addition to the faculty of memory» trans. by H. 
Tredennick. 
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and (d) in De Memoria et Reminiscentia I, 450 a 12-17 Aristotle notes that memory 
involves phantasia: 
«ἡ δὲ μνήμη, καὶ ἡ τῶν νοητῶν, οὐκ ἄνευ φαντάσματός ἐστιν· ὥστε τοῦ νοῦ μὲν 
κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἂν εἴη, καθ᾽ αὑτὸ δὲ τοῦ πρώτου αἰσθητικοῦ. διὸ καὶ ἑτέροις 
τισὶν ὑπάρχει τῶν ζῴων, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώποις καὶ τοῖς ἔχουσι δόξαν ἢ 
φρόνησιν»74. 
Furthermore, as David Ross points out, Aristotle «says none of these things about 
grubs [scolexes]»75, except that: (a) «a scolex is that out of which in its entirety an 
animal is produce whole, by differentiation and growth of the foetus» («σκώληξ δ᾽ 
ἐστὶν ἐξ οὗ ὅλου ὅλον γίνεται τὸ ζῷον, διαρθρουμένου καὶ αὐξανομένου τοῦ 
κυήματος»)76, (b) «just as the animal is perfect but the scolex and the egg are 
imperfect» («ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ μὲν ζῷον τέλειον, ὁ σκώληξ καὶ τὸ δ᾽ ᾠὸν ἀτελές»)77 
etc. So, according to the American entomologist William Forbes, the σκώληξ has to 
be «the first stage of the life-history of an insect or other creature which he [Aristotle] 
did not recognize as produced by birth or hatching from a real egg. Sometimes he 
actually had an egg in mind (when he refers to it as hard shelled but soft inside), while 
in other cases it is obviously the first-stage larva»78. 
Accordingly, in view of all of these facts, I accept Torstrik’s emendation of the 
text «δοκεῖ δ᾽ οὔ, οἷον μύρμηκι ἢ μελίττῃ ἢ σκώληκι»79, as «δοκεῖ, οἷον μύρμηκι 
μὲν ἢ μελίττῃ ἢ σκώληκι δ᾽ οὔ» («it seems that it [phantasia] is found in the ant and 
                                                          
74
 Idem., De Memoria et Reminiscentia I, 450 a 12-17: «and memory even of noêmata is not without a 
phantasma; therefore memory belongs to the rational part only per accidens, while per se to the 
primary part of the sensitive part. Therefore some other animals have memory, and not only human 
beings and those beings that have opinion or judgment». 
75
 Aristotle, De Anima, edited with introduction and commentary by Sir David Ross (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1961), p. 286. William Forbes stresses that the word σκώληξ in the Aristotelian texts 
«is not a ‘grub’ in general as usually translated, and never a ‘worm’ (vermis or vermiculus)», but it 
corresponds in a way with the «earthworm» and «the maggot-like larvae of the wasps» [cf. William T. 
M. Forbes, «The Silkworm of Aristotle», in Classical Philology, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Jan. 1930): p. 23]. 
76
 Aristotle, Historia Animalium, I, 5, 489 b 9-11. 
77
 Idem., De Generatione Animalium, II, 1, 733 a 1-2. 
78
 See William T. M. Forbes, op. cit. p. 23.  
79
 Aristotle, De Anima., III, 3, 428 a 10-11. 
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the bee, but not in the scolex»). And, as Robert Hicks80, Edwin Wallace81, and David 
Ross82 point out, Torstrik’s emendation of the text is based on the reading of 
Themistius83 and Sophonias84. 
Therefore, from the previous analysis, we may conclude that the ants and the 
bees, which are intelligent creatures and have memory, should be included to the 
animals that possess the sensitive kind of phantasia (αἰσθητικὴ φαντασία). Whereas 
the scolex, which has to be «the first stage of the life-history of an insect or other 
creature», does not have phantasia.  
 
Aristotle’s Classification of Animals 
Blooded Animals85 Bloodless Animals86 
                                                          
80
 Aristotle, De Anima, with translation, introduction and notes by Robert D. Hicks [New York: Arno 
Press, 1976 (19071)], p. 462. 
81
 Aristotle, Aristotle’s Psychology, with introduction and notes by Edwin Wallace (New York: Arno 
Press, 1976), p. 263. 
82
 Aristotle, De Anima, edited with introduction and commentary by Sir David Ross (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1961), pp. 286-287. 
83
 Themistius, op. cit., 5, 3, 90, 5-8: «ἔπειτα αἴσθησις μὲν πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζώοις, φαντασία 
δὲ τοῖς μὲν τοῖς δὲ οὔ, μύρμηκι μὲν ἴσως καὶ μελίττῃ καὶ πολλῷ μᾶλλον κυνὶ καὶ ἵππῳ καὶ 
ὅσα μετέχει αἰσθήσεως, σκώληκι δὲ οὔ». 
84
 Sophonias, Aristotelis Libros De Anima Paraphrasis, 55, 27-32: «μύρμηξι μὲν γὰρ καὶ 
μελίτταις καὶ τοῖς ὁμοίοις, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τοῖς ὑπὲρ ταῦτα, καὶ ἁπλῶς οἷς τισιν οὐκ ἀόριστος 
οὐδ᾽ ἀνεπίστροφος κίνησις, ἀνάγκη παρεῖναι φαντασίαν, πρὸς ἣν ποιοῦνται τεταγμένην 
τὴν κίνησιν· σκώλυκες δὲ καὶ μυῖαι καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἀτάκτως καὶ ἀορίστως ὁρῶνται 
κινούμενα καὶ μάλιστα τὰ ἐκ σήψεως ἐπετείως γινόμενα ἢ οὐ δοκοῦσιν ὅλως ἔχειν ἢ 
ἀμυδράν τινα». 
85
 Aristotle, Historia Animalium, ΙΙ, 15, 505 b 28-32: «Ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα (namely ἔναιμα) ἄνθρωπός 
τε καὶ τὰ ζῳοτόκα τῶν τετραπόδων, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ ᾠοτόκα τῶν τετραπόδων καὶ ὄρνις καὶ 
ἰχθὺς καὶ κῆτος, καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ἀνώνυμόν ἐστι διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι γένος ἀλλ᾽ ἁπλοῦν τὸ εἶδος 
ἐπὶ τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, οἷον ὄφις καὶ κροκόδειλος». 
86
 Idem., De Partibus Animalium, ΙV, 5, 678 a 27-31: «Τὰ δὲ καλούμενα μαλάκια καὶ 
μαλακόστρακα πολλὴν ἔχει πρὸς ταῦτα διαφοράν· εὐθὺς γὰρ τὴν τῶν σπλάγχνων 
ἅπασαν οὐκ ἔχει φύσιν. ὁμοίως δ᾽ οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἀναίμων οὐδέν. ἔστι δὲ δύο γένη 
λοιπὰ τῶν ἀναίμων, τά τε ὀστρακόδερμα καὶ τὸ τῶν ἐντόμων γένος». 
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(Vertebrates) (Invertebrates) 
1. Man 1. Hard-Shelled Animals (Clams, 
Oysters, etc.) 
2. Viviparous Quadrupeds 2. Weak-Shelled Animals (Crabs etc.) 
3. Cetacea (Wales, Dolphins, Seals) 3. Cephalopoda (Squids, Cuttle-Fishes 
etc.) 
4. Birds 4. Insects 
5. Oviparous Quadrupeds and Footless 
Animals (Reptiles and Amphibians) 
 
5. Zoophytes (Anemones, Holothuria, 
Sponges etc.) 6. Fishes 
Table 4 
(c) Calculative or Deliberative Phantasia (Λογιστικὴ or Βουλευτικὴ Φαντασία)  
The third kind or grade of phantasia is that which is calculative (λογιστική) or 
deliberative (βουλευτική): 
«φαντασία δὲ πᾶσα ἢ λογιστικὴ ἢ αἰσθητική»87. 
«ἡ δὲ βουλευτικὴ [φαντασία] ἐν τοῖς λογιστικοῖς»88. 
It should be underlined here that the epithets/adjectives «λογιστική» (calculative) and 
«βουλευτική» (deliberative) are equivalent. The verbs «λογίζομαι» and 
«βουλεύομαι» are synonymous, since they both mean, «to determine, to consider». 
But what kind of phantasia is that which is calculative or deliberative? Is there a 
phantasma involved? The Stageirite philosopher notices that: 
«ἡ μὲν οὖν αἰσθητικὴ φαντασία, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις 
ὑπάρχει, ἡ δὲ βουλευτικὴ ἐν τοῖς λογιστικοῖς (πότερον γὰρ πράξει τόδε ἢ τόδε, 
λογισμοῦ ἤδη ἐστὶν ἔργον· καὶ ἀνάγκη ἑνὶ μετρεῖν89· τὸ μεῖζον γὰρ διώκει. ὥστε 
                                                          
87
 Aristotle, De Anima, III, 10, 433 b 29. 
88
 Ibid., III, 11, 434 a 7. 
89
 The Greek translator and commentator of the treatise De Anima, Andreas Papatheodorou, notices 
that pleasure, interest and duty are some of the standards or criteria of measurement that intelligent 
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δύναται ἕν ἐκ πλειόνων φαντασμάτων ποιεῖν). καὶ αἴτιον τοῦτο τοῦ δόξαν μὴ 
δοκεῖν ἔχειν, ὅτι τὴν ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ οὐκ ἔχει, αὕτη δὲ ἐκείνην»90. 
The third kind or grade of phantasia is found in those animals, which possess 
reason, or, as Sir David Ross asserts, «the deliberative imagination, the rational 
imagination…is monopoly of reasoning beings, i.e. of men»91. For whether a person 
will do this or that is the work of calculation, of reasoning. Of course, rational beings 
do not always act according to a plan (use of calculative or deliberative phantasia), 
but they can also act according to the awareness of the moment (use of sensitive 
phantasia). 
What the philosopher meant by saying «καὶ αἴτιον τοῦτο τοῦ δόξαν μὴ δοκεῖν 
ἔχειν, ὅτι τὴν ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ οὐκ ἔχει, αὕτη δὲ ἐκείνην», was that other animals 
than man are thought not to have opinion (δόξα), because their desires have no 
deliberation. Only animals with intellect—and therefore language— have the 
phantasia that comes from inference. This kind of phantasia appears as an 
intermediate between sense perception (αἰσθάνεσθαι) and nous or mind (νοῦς). It 
involves having and combining several mental images (phantasmata) into one. This is 
the difference between human beings and animals. The elaboration, organization and 
unification of images (phantasmata) are typical characteristics of human beings (see 
table 5). 
It should be noticed that the activity of calculative or deliberative phantasia 
involves the use of phantasmata with (a) propositional and (b) pictorial or quasi-
pictorial content:  
(a) propositional content 
                                                                                                                                                                      
animals use in order to pursue whichever is superior [see Aristotle, De Anima, II-III, text, translation 
and notes by Andreas Papatheodorou (in Greek) (Athens: «Papyrus» Publications, no date), p. 92]. 
90
 Ibid., ΙΙΙ, 11, 434 a 5-12: « Sensitive phantasia, then, as it has been said, exists also in the other 
animals, but deliberative phantasia in those that are calculative; for the decision whether it will do this 
or that, is already a work of calculation; and there must be a single standard to measure by; for one 
pursues what is superior. Hence one has the ability to make one phantasma out of many phantasmata. 
And the reason why [these animals] are thought not to have opinion is that they do not have opinion 
which comes from inference, though this [opinion] involves that [phantasia]». 
91
 See Aristotle, De Anima, edited with introduction and commentary by Sir David Ross (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1961), p. 319.  
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«ἡ δὲ βουλευτικὴ ἐν τοῖς λογιστικοῖς (πότερον γὰρ πράξει τόδε ἢ τόδε, λογισμοῦ 
ἤδη ἐστὶν ἔργον·»92 
(b) pictorial or quasi-pictorial content 
«ὁτὲ δὲ τοῖς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ φαντάσμασιν ἢ νοήμασιν ὥσπερ ὁρῶν λογίζεται καὶ 
βουλεύεται τὰ μέλλοντα πρὸς τὰ παρόντα·»93 
The above examples (a) and (b) are excellent Aristotelian remarks with respect 
to contemporary ideas about mental images94. 
 
Rational Animals 
⇓ 
Senses of Taste, Touch, Smell, Sight and Hearing = they can sense: (a) in contact with 
them, and (b) objects at a non contact-distance with them 
⇓ 
Sensitive Phantasia 
⇓ 
Phantasmata (Images/Representations of Taste, Touch, Smell, Sight and Hearing) = 
these animals have the ability to retain and to combine phantasmata after the sense 
object is gone 
⇓ 
                                                          
92
 Aristotle, De Anima, ΙΙΙ, 11, 434 a 7-8. See note 88. 
93
 Ibid., ΙΙΙ, 7, 431 b 6-8: «and when by the phantasmata or the noemata in the soul it calculates, as if 
seeing them, and deliberates what is going to happen in the future in relation to the present».  
94
 Two of the most important contemporary theories of mental images or mental imagery are the 
“Analog or Pictorial Representation Account” (Kosslyn, Sheppard etc.) and the “Propositional 
Representation Account” (Pylyshyn, Fodor etc.). The “Analog or Pictorial Representation Account” 
says that visual informations are stored in the brain in an analog or a picture-like (quasi-pictorial) code. 
The “Propositional Representation Account” on the contrary argues that visual informations are stored 
in the brain in a propositional or a word-like code. Cf. S. M. Kosslyn – T. M. Ball – B. J. Reiser, 
«Visual Images Preserve Metric Spatial Information: Evidence from Studies of Image Scanning», 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, Vol. 4 (1978): pp. 47-60. 
Zenon W. Pylyshyn, «The Imagery Debate: Analogue Media versus Tacit Knowledge», Psychological 
Review, 88 (1981): pp. 16-45. Ned J. Block, Imagery (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981). 
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Calculative or Deliberative Phantasia 
⇓ 
Phantasmata (Mental Images/Mental Representations of Taste, Touch, Smell, Sight 
and Hearing either pictorial or quasi – pictorial or propositional content) = these 
animals have the ability to retain and to combine phantasmata after the sense object is 
gone  
⇑ 
Nous 
Table 5 
IV. Conclusion 
On the basis of the analysis undertaken above it appears that Aristotle’s treatment 
of phantasia/imagination is a complicated subject. Phantasia is a faculty of the soul, 
the imaginative (φανταστικόν), that is placed between sensation (αἴσθησις) and 
thought (διάνοια). On the one hand it depends on sensation, is a kind of affection 
(πάθος), and on the other is a necessary condition for memory, motion, desire, 
dreaming, thinking etc. In other words it is connected with a wide variety of 
psychological phenomena.  
Furthermore, it has been noted that phantasmata, are the products of the function 
of phantasia, resulting from sense perception (αἰσθάνεσθαι). Phantasmata are 
(mental) representations or (mental) images of sense objects. They have several 
functions, as for example remembering and thinking process.  
Thereafter, I have tried to show that a detailed study of the notion of phantasia in 
De Anima, Book III, leads us to the conclusion that the Stageirite philosopher 
discriminates not two —as it is commonly argued— but three kinds or grades of 
phantasia: (a) Ιndefinite/indeterminate phantasia (ἀόριστος φαντασία) which is to 
be found in the imperfectly developed creatures — they have no sense except that of 
touch—, as for example zoophytes and molluscs, which have the power of formatting 
diffuse and indefinite phantasmata. (b) Sensitive phantasia (αἰσθητικὴ φαντασία) 
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which is to be found in animals that possess more than one sense (normal animals) 
and have the power of forming more vivid phantasmata. (c) Calculative, or 
deliberative, phantasia (λογιστικὴ or βουλευτικὴ φαντασία) which is the highest 
development of the faculty of phantasia. It appears only in human beings, because 
they have the power of thinking and the ability to combine several mental images 
(phantasmata) into one. 
Thomas J. T. Nigel notes that «the impact on latter thinkers of Aristotle’s account 
of cognition in general, and of imagery and imagination in particular, was enormous, 
and extended far beyond those who were avowed Aristotelians»95. Indeed, Aristotle’s 
treatment of phantasia in De Anima exerted an important influence on Hellenistic 
philosophy96 and Western thought (Medieval and Modern)97. 
Beyond this, if we shed further light on Aristotle’s theory of phantasia and 
phantasmata, we shall find deep conceptual relationship with the current debate over 
the issue of mental images or mental imagery. But this is another issue that needs 
further investigation98. 
 
 
Christina S. Papachristou  
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
95
 See Thomas J. T Nigel, «Aristotle’s Influence», Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mental-imagery/aristotle-influence.html>. 
96
 Cf. the Stoics’ theory of phantasia. 
97
 E.g. St. Thomas Aquinas’s account on imagination (imaginatio), Rene Descartes’ views on the 
function of the faculty of imagination etc. 
98
 Cf. Christina S. Papachristou, «The Mental Images (Phantasmata) in Aristotle’s De Anima and in S. 
Kosslyn’s Contemporary Work» (in Greek), in Demetra Sfendoni-Mentzou (ed.), The Aristotelian 
Philosophy and the Contemporary Scientific Thought (Thessaloniki: Aristotle University of 
Thessaloniki, 2006), pp.112-134. 
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